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COMMENTS
states that "even the SEC, whose accomplishment in clarifying law through
rule-making is outstanding among the agencies, unduly restrains from re-
sort to rule making." If the SEC continues to adopt the proposals made
in the Wheat Report, Professor Davis should henceforth limit his criticism
to agencies other than the SEC.
L. THOMAS ELLISTON
FEDERAL COURTS-PROPOSED AIRCRAFT CRASH
LITIGATION LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenal growth in the aviation industry is common knowl-
edge today. A recent commentary declared that some 2,600 commercial
craft and 120,000 private planes now crowd the nation's skies.1 An alarm-
ing consequence of this growth in air traffic is an increase in the number
of airplane crashes. In addition, more people are involved in the typical
crash. In July, 1967, a Piedmont Airlines Boeing 727 and a private aircraft
collided near Hendersonville, North Carolina, killing 82 persons; and in
September, 1969, an Alleghenny Airlines flight collided with a private
plane at Indianapolis, Indiana, killing 83. The 1968 passenger death toll
on U.S. airlines was 303, the result of ten accidents which also took the lives
of 34 crew members. This total made 1968 the second worst fatality year
in airline history, surpassed only by the year 1960, in which total passenger
deaths reached 334.2
The legal consequences of an air crash are infinitely more complex than
other transportation disasters, and the litigation almost always presents
special problems. A single crash often gives rise to multiple claims filed in
diverse federal districts, each of which has proper jurisdiction and venue.
For example, as of January 14, 1969, some 64 separate cases involving
wrongful death or personal injury were pending in federal districts in New
York, Missouri, and North Carolina, each a result of the Hendersonville
disaster.3 It is obvious that sixty-four separate trials, each involving the
basic questions of the liability of several possible defendants, 4 would pro-
duce costly duplication of discovery proceedings, attorneys' fees, and the
other litigation costs, not to mention the pressure on judicial dockets. Since
liability may vary in accordance with the particular state law under which
the case is tried, such duplication is arguably a necessary price for a federal
1. TmE, September 19, 1969, at 64.
2. The Washington Post, January 5, 1969, cited in Hearings on S. 961 Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. w,
at 264 (1959).
3. In re Mid-Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039
(J.P.M.L. 1969).
4. Defendants in these cases often include all airline companies involved,
manufacturers of the aircraft, the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, and the individual pilots and crew members or their estates.
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system of law. State law, which ordinarily controls the resolution of sub-
stantive issues, may vary as to the use of certain defenses, the burden of
proof, the availability of certain theories of recovery such as strict liability,
and the use of certain doctrines which ease the plaintiff's burden of proof
or which help to overcome certain affirmative defenses (e.g., res ipsa lo-
quitur, last clear chance). Additionally, there is the danger of a wide dis-
parity in the amounts recovered by different plaintiffs, since nine juris-
dictions, including Missouri, limit the amount recoverable in a wrongful
death action. 5
For these reasons, a need exists for more efficient judicial handling
of the legal questions which arise from aircraft disasters. At the present
time, federal law provides two statutory remedies, the purposes of which
are to alleviate the problems inherent in multiple litigation of identical
factual questions.
II. EXISTING FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. Change of Venue
The most widely utilized procedure is section 1404 (a) in title 28 of the
United States Code which provides: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."6
This section, in essence a codification of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens,7 permits consolidation of actions for trial and has definite ap-
plicability in multi-district aircraft crash litigation. It allows a court to
consider in which available district s the litigation would be the most con-
venient to all parties and witnesses, and accordingly transfer the case to that
district. However, before there can be any transfer under section 1404 (a),
federal jurisdiction must first exist. Such jurisdiction is usually based on
diversity of citizenship. However, when no diversity exists, and an action is
filed in a state court, the remedy provided by section 1404 (a) is totally un-
available.
5. Nine jurisdictions have such legislation at the present time. They are
Missouri, § 537.090, RSMo 1967 Supp. ($50,000); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws,
ch. 229, § 2 (1967 Supp.) ($50,000); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (1967 Supp.)
($35,000); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 895.04 ($23,500); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
§ 573.02 (1967 Supp.) ($35,000); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (1968 Supp.)
($25,000, recently reduced from $50,000); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-7-6 (1967) ($10,000 to estate, $100,000 to dependent distributees); Illinois,
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 70, § 2 (1967) ($30,000); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1-3 (1963) ($25,000).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1964). See Annot., 1 A.L.R. FED. 15 (1969).
7. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is bottomed upon the right
of the Court in the exercise of its equitable powers to refuse
the imposition upon its jurisdiction of the trial of cases, even
though the venue is properly laid, if it appears that, for the conveni-
ence of the litigants and the witnesses, in the interest of justice, the
action should be instituted in another forum where the action might
have been brought.
Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. 9= P. R.R., 79 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D.C. Minn. 1948).
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Whether this section, although admittedly applicable to the air crash
case, is adequate to insure the efficient operation of the judicial system is
subject to question. Obviously, if actions arising from the same occurrence
are filed in several districts, there is the possibility, however remote, that
two or more courts will differ on the choice of the most convenient forum.
This would only serve to add confusion to the problem sought to be
remedied. Moreover, should such an anomalous result occur, the only avail-
able remedy would be an extraordinary writ, since the order of transfer as
such is not an order from which an appeal can be taken.9 Furthermore, as
pointed out by Judge William H. Becker, District Judge for the Western
District of Missouri, in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
a transfer under section 1404 (a) is a transfer for all purposes, the section
having no provision to allow recall and adjudication of issues which might
not be common to the other cases involved. 10 The transfer would consoli-
date cases because of common questions of fact, but simultaneously trying
other issues would waste the time and money of parties not concerned
with these divergent issues and place an undue burden on the court and
jury.
The possibility also exists that the most convenient forum for all
parties and witnesses may not be one to which transfer could be had under
section 1404 (a). The Supreme Court, in Hoffman v. Blaski," has held that
transfer to a district where the action might have been brought is limited
to districts where the plaintiff had an absolute right to institute suit at the
time the action was filed. Since present venue requirements are quite
narrow-especially in diversity actions where venue exists only in those
judicial districts where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or where the
claim arosel.2-it is easy to conceive of a situation where the only district
to which all cases could be transferred would be the situs of the accident.
This, in many cases, would not be the most convenient district in which
to try the case.
Serious choice of law problems are inherent in a 1404 (a) transfer and
the result can be inconsistent treatment of plaintiffs, particularly in wrong-
ful death cases. For many years it was uncertain whether, upon transfer
under section 1404 (a), the transferee court must apply the law of the forum
state per Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 3 or the law of the state in which the
transferor court was situate. The federal courts have split on this point,' 4
9. C. WRIGHT, supra note 8.
10. Hearings on S. 961 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judi-
cial Machinery, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. w, 233 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
The statement of Judge Becker, who was appearing ostensibly not to promote
any legislation but rather to testify as to the availability and usefulness of present
judicial machinery, mentions several of the objections to § 1404 (a) outlined in the
body of this article.
11. 363 U.S. 335 (1960). In this case defendant, seeking transfer to a district
where plaintiff could not have sued, agreed to submit to service of process, con-
tending that venue objections, like objections to the lack of jurisdiction over the
person, could be waived.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1891 (1964). See note 24, infra.
13. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14. See the discussion in C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 44.
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some circuits holding that the law of the transferor forum applies, with
others applying the law of the transferee forum.15 The question was par-
tially resolved in the 1964 Supreme Court decision of Van Dusen v. Bar-
rack,'6 which directed the transferee court to apply the law of the state of
the transferor court. This decision, while stating the applicable rule of law,
did not provide relief from the inequity proclaimed to exist in a 1404 (a)
transfer. The reason for this was that regardless of which state's laws are
applied, it is entirely conceivable that one trial, arising from air crash
claims and the product of 1404 (a) transfers, would be tried under several
sets of laws, those of each of the various transferor jurisdictions. Differences
in tests for liability, availability of defenses, and differing limits on wrong-
ful death recovery would be virtually certain in any large scale transfers.
Myriad instructions, involving the application of different laws for dif-
ferent plaintiffs, are bound to produce nothing but headaches in the jury
room.
17
B. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
The second federal statutory remedy, which became law in 1968 and is
found in section 1407 in title 28 of the United States Code, created a
"Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation" composed of seven federal dis-
trict and court of appeals judges. This panel was given the power to trans-
fer cases involving the same question of fact to a single district for con-
solidated pre-trial proceedings.'s A transfer can be initiated either by the
motion of a party to an action or by the panel on its own motion.' 9 Such
transfer was designed to deal specifically with any multi-district litigation of
numerous claims involving the same factual issues. The bulk of the Panel's
business thus far has been antitrust and airline crash cases. 20
The usefulness of such a procedure in airplane crash litigation is
15. Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950), and
H. L. Green Co., Inc. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), held that thelaw of the transferor state should be applied. However, Reynolds v. Baltimore &-0. R.R., 185 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947 (1951), held that
the law of the transferee state should apply.
16. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
17. A foreseeable, related problem is that a $50,000 death limitation may,
consciously or unconsciously, cause a jury to hold down the amount given other
plaintiffs not subject to such a limitation.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (a), provides:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact arepending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such trans-
fers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation au-
thorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for suchproceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so
transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of
such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred
unless it shall have been previously terminated ....19. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (c) (1964). It should also be noted that § 1407 provides
that the only appeal or review of an order of transfer by the Panel is by way
of an extraordinary writ under 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
20. Report of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation., Hearings at 266.
[Vol. 35
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obvious. There is no limitation regarding the district to which the case
may be transferred since there is no requirement that the transferee district
be one where the action might have been brought. Furthermore, with one
judicial entity, the Panel, making the decision to transfer, the problem of
coordination between courts as to which district the case should be trans-
ferred is avoided.
However, the limitation of section 1407 is equally obvious. The trans-
fer is for pre-trial proceedings only. Granted, while this goes a long way
toward alleviating the waste of time, money, and energy, it does nothing
to ease the burden of separately trying each case. Therefore, all consolida-
tion for trial must still proceed under section 1404 (a) and will be subject
to the problems presented by a 1404 (a) transfer.
Still another possible solution, which has been used in some instances,
is the "test case" approach, whereby all plaintiffs and defendants contract
to be bound by the result reached in litigation between one plaintiff and
all defendants. Rather than being an answer to the problem, however, it
simply underscores the need for change, since the litigants themselves are
seeking more satisfactory methods for trying their cases. In addition, this
method is limited in that it serves only to determine liability, with damages,
if not settled, the subject of further independent lawsuits.
III. THE PaoposED LEGISLATION
Senate Bill 961,21 introduced in the Ninety-First Congress by Senator
Joseph D. Tydings of Maryland, and entitled, "A Bill to Improve the Ju-
dicial Machinery by Providing for Federal Jurisdiction and a Body of Uni-
form Federal Law for Cases Arising out of Aviation and Space Activities,"
proposes to confer exclusive, original jurisdiction upon federal district
courts to hear all claims for damages and wrongful death arising from any
airline crash covered by the legislation. Federal jurisdiction would lie
when the crash involved, (1) a common air carrier, (2) an aircraft which
seated more than ten persons, (3) the death or injury of at least five persons,
or (4) any outer space activity.2 2 Any actions brought under this proposed
statute would have to be brought within one year after the cause of action
accrues.
23
The venue provisions are more liberal than the existing ones found
under the general venue section of the United States Code.24 The proposed
21. S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). [Hereinafter cited as S. 961, §-.]
At the present time, S. 961 is still in Senate Committee. No action upon the bill
is expected during this term of congress. Letter from Senator Thomas Eagleton
to the Missouri Law Review, Feb. 19, 1970. The Appendix to this comment con-
tains the salient portions of S. 961.
22. S. 961, § 1363. The constitutional basis for the enactment of S. 961 is the
commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
23. S. 961, § 2753.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1891 (1968 Supp.), amending 28 U.S.C. § 1891 (1964), pro-
vides that a diversity action may be brought "only in the judicial district where
all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose." A non-diversity
suit must be brought in the district where all defendants reside, or where the
claim arose. A corporation may be sued in any district where it is incorporated,
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Bill allows suit in any district where plaintiff resides or does business, or
where defendant resides, is incorporated, does business, or can be found.25
Any action against the United States can be filed in any district.2 6 The Bill
also provides that service of process, including subpoenas, may be had
throughout the United States.27 Having given the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction and having made several forums available to prospective plain-
tiffs, the Bill further provides that, should an occurrence covered by the
Bill engender suits in more than one district, the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation noted above shall have power to transfer the case to any
district which it considers the most convenient, not merely for pre-trial pro-
ceedings but for all purposes.28
The Bill would add a new chapter to title 28 of the United States
Code. Its provisions, which would cover "all civil legal relations" in an
action under the jurisdiction described above, would be exclusive of all
other law except to the extent that local law is adopted by the trial court.29
The term "local law," which appears elsewhere as used in the Bill refers to
local domestic relations law, inheritance laws, etc.3 0 Such a provision is an
obvious and effective way to end the conflict of law problems.
A right of action is conferred for damage to property, for personal in-
jury, and for wrongful death when these are the result of an air disaster.8 1
The test for liability is left to formulation by the courts.3 2 The Bill pro-
vides for the defense of contributory negligence as applied "in the majority
of the States of the United States."83 Contribution between joint tortfeasors
is required, in a percentage determined by the jury in relation to each de-
fendant's degree of liability.3 4
As to the provisions for wrongful death, the Bill declares its underly-
ing policy to be that any action for wrongful death can only be brought
for the benefit of the surviving spouse, children, parents, and dependent
25. S. 961, § 1408 (a).
26. Id.
27. S. 961, § 1408 (b). FED. R. Crv. P. 4(f) provides for service of process
within the boundaries of the state where the district court is held unless this terri-
torial limitation is expanded by other federal statutes. FED). R. Civ. P. 45 (e) pro-
vides for service of a subpoena within 100 miles of the place of trial.
28. S. 961, § 1408 (c).
29. Id. § 2751 (a). To the extent that the statute authorizes the courts to
formulate federal law or allows adoption of local, state law by the federal courts,
it calls for the creation of "federal common law" in a manner somewhat analagous
to that required by the United States Supreme Court in interpretation and en-
forcement of collective bargaining agreements. In Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957), the Supreme Court said:
the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) [dealing with collective
bargaining contracts] is federal law, which the courts must fashion from
the policy of our national laws.... But state law, if compatible with the
purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will
best effectuate the federal policy.
30. S. 961, § 2751 (a).
31. Id. § 2752 (a).
32. Id. § 2751 (a).
33. Id. § 2752 (a) (1).
34. Id. § 2752 (a) (2).
[Vol. 35
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relatives of the deceased.3 5 The deceased's estate, by exclusion, is not a
beneficiary, although his personal representative is permitted to sue for
wrongful death.3 6 In determining the priority of interests of the benefici-
aries, the law of decedent's domicile will be applied.3 7
The Bill also provides for the recovery of pecuniary loss (as opposed
to compensation for grief and mental suffering of survivors) in a wrong-
ful death action, 8 but expressly states that there shall be no limitation on
damages.39 Claims for personal injury of a decedent will survive40 but will
be combined with the wrongful death action.4 1 No damages will be granted
for pain and suffering or for disfigurement of a decedent. 42
IV. EVALUATION
A. Statute of Limitations
The primary complaint voiced by opponents of the Bill43 is that its one
year statute of limitations is too short. However, there does appear to
be some justification for the period. The reasoning which underlies
this provision is probably that, under such a limitation period, all law-
suits could be transferred and consolidated within one year, thereby clear-
ing the matter from the Panel's docket in a relatively short time and getting
coordinated discovery and other pre-trial proceedings underway quickly.
Such a policy of limitation is laudable, but is should be balanced
against the other interests involved. Investigation of accidents by prospec-
tive litigants and agencies of the federal government could conceivably drag
on past the one-year benchmark. Claims against the United States, such as
those based on negligence of air traffic controllers who are employees of
the Federal Aviation Agency, would be under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.44 Under the Tort Claims Act, a claim must first be presented to the
head of the federal agency affected, who then has six months in which to
approve or deny the claim, which denial is a prerequisite to filing suit. As
pointed out by the American Bar Association Section of Insurance, Negli-
gence, aid Compensation, Law, 45 such claims would have to be filed with
the agency within six months, or the claimant's further procrastination
could bar him from any legal remedy. In short, a one year limitations
period is reduced to six months when the remedy sought is under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
35. Id. § 2752 (b).
56. Id. § 2762.
37. Id. § 2752 (c).
38. Id. § 2752 (d).
39. Id.
40. S. 961, § 2752 (b) (2).
41. Id. § 2762 (d).
42. Id. § 2752 (d).
43. The primary opponent appearing at the hearings was Mr. Lee S. Kriend-
ler, a New York attorney who specializes in airplane crash litigation. His pre-
pared statement set forth some of the criticisms discussed in this article.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
45. Hearings at 254.
1970]
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Furthermore, this Bill, although ostensibly seeking to provide a broad
remedy, actually narrows the rights of almost all plaintiffs by the use of the
one year statute of limitations. For example, under the Erie doctrine,46 a
federal court would normally apply state law in a wrongful death diversity
case: and most states have limitations of at least two years on wrongful
death action.47 (Similarly, general statutes of limitations for personal in-
jury actions are usually much longer, usually up to five years.) Therefore,
the proposal in effect would shorten the period of time in which plaintiffs
must file suit.
The hardships caused by such a limitation clearly seem to outweigh
the policy considerations behind it. In light of the foregoing, the American
Bar Association has recommended that the limitation period be extended
to two years.48 Such a period seems much more reasonable.
B. Contributory Negligence
The contributory negligence section of the Bill provides as follows:
"the contributory negligence doctrine of the law of the majority of states
of the United States is applicable to any such action."49 Presumably, the
law in a majority of states is that contributory negligence is a bar to re-
covery., If this is the rule the statute professes to promulgate, it should be
explicitly stated since stating it in the foregoing manner leads not only to
speculation and confusion but makes the drafting of instructions impos-
sible. In addition, it can be argued that should the comparative negligence
approach (i.e., the application of the general theory that a plaintiff's negli-
gence will not bar recovery, but that the jury will reduce his damages pro-
portionately to the amount of negligence attributable to him) become the
majority approach, the proposed statate would automatically accommodate
it and adjust the federal law accordingly. However, the amendment process
in federal legislation is not so difficult that statutory clarity must be sacri-
ficed today to accommodate a change tomorrow.
A viable alternative to the Bill's contributory negligence section might
be to substitute a comparative negligence doctrine in its place. If a jury
is competent enough to apportion damages among various defendants in
proportion to their degree of negligence (and this is questionable),51 then
46. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
47. See, e.g., § 537.100, RSMo 1967 Supp.; MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 229, § 1
(1958); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-404 (1966 Supp.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (1963);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1514 (1964); Wis. STAT. § 230.21 (1966); MD. ANN.
CODE, art. 67, § 4 (1957). But see Ky. REv. STAT. § 413.140 (1968), which sets
forth a one-year period of limitations.
48. Hearings at 254.
49. S. 961, § 2752 (a) (1).
50. States which currently have comparative negligence legislation are Arkan-
sas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1 (1947); Nebraska, N.E. REv. STAT. § 25-1151
(1948); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 331.045 (1963); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603
1933; Mississippi, Miss. CoDE ANN. § 1454 (1942); and South Dakota, S.D.C.L.
§20-9.2 (1967).
51. Whether a jury is competent to determine what proportion of the overall
negligence was attributable to whom has long been the point of attack for oppo-
nents of comparative negligence treatment of the defense of contributory negli-
gence. See generally, Klinginsmith, Torts-Comparative Negligence-Good or Illfor Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 137 (1965).
[Vol. 35
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it is likewise competent to determine a plaintiffs comparative contributory
negligence, if any, and adjust his recovery accordingly. There is no ques-
tion but that comparative negligence is a proper approach for federal law
to take, since it is now part of the Federal Employer's Liability Act.5 2 As
in FELA, the proposed Bill creates a remedy for persons injured or killed
by the operation of a transportation media, and it could be argued that
because of this similarity federal law on contributory negligence should be
consistent. If this is so, decisions in FELA cases concerned with the appli-
cation of comparative negligence theories would be very persuasive au-
thority on similar questions arising under this Bill, and would provide the
rules of law now sorely lacking within it.53
C. Scope of Liability
Perhaps the weakest part of Senate Bill 961 is that it leaves to the
courts the formulation of the rules of liability under which the case will
be tried.54 As a result, instead of establishing a "uniform body of federal
law," it merely gives the judiciary a free hand to make this law. The Bill
never mentions the concept of negligence and never describes any act or
omission which would give rise to liability. The writer presumes that
a plaintiff would allege negligence (simply because contributory negli-
gence is a defense), but whether he could plead and submit on strict lia-
bility, res ipsa loquitur, or some other theory is left to judicial decision.
The end result of this weakness in the Bill is that the rules of law under
which such actions are to proceed are non-existent. Such uncertainty could
hamper settlement negotiations and lead to extended litigation. For this
reason the drafters of the Bill should reconsider and supply at least some
general guidelines regarding the criteria for liability, leaving only the fine
points to judicial formulation.
The Bill provides that its provisions cover "all civil-legal relations" 5
arising from an incident covered by the Bill's jurisdiction. This clause in-
vites litigation and controversy because it is manifestly overbroad, appar-
ently covering many legal relationships which the statute was not designed
to cover. For example, a medical malpractice claim arising from treatment
of injuries received in such a plane accident could qualify as a requisite
"legal relation." However, it certainly should not be within the ambit
52. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1964), states:
the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negli-
gence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to each
employee....
53. An unanswered and interesting question which is necessarily adjunct to
the contributory negligence problem is whether the doctrines of "last dear chance"
and the so-called "humanitarian negligence"-both of which mitigate a contrib-
utory negligence defense-are included with the defense applied in the "majority
of the States of the United States." The argument could be made, probably with
some success, that such doctrines are indeed a part of the contributory negligence
law of a particular jurisdiction, and would thereby be applicable under such a
statute.




Johnson: Johnson: Federal Courts
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
of the Bill. Rather, the provision should be changed to expressly limit the
statute's application to actions against those whose culpability was causal
to the crash; to actions for personal injury, property damage, death claims;
and to actions involving ancillary but directly related issues. Otherwise,
the provision as presently drafted will only impede a supposedly stream-
lined litigation process and thereby ultimately frustrate the primary pur-
pose of the Bill, i.e., speedy legal relief for a large number of claimants with
similar claims.
D. Choice of Law
In opposition to the Bill, it has also been argued that the present
choice of law problems are not so critical as to warrant legislation of this
type. In his statement presented at the subcommittee hearing on Senate
Bill 961, Mr. Lee S. Kriendler, New York attorney, stated:
One of the Bill's manifest purposes is to eliminate choice of law
problems in aviation disasters. These problems, however, are large-
ly in terms of the existence of wrongful death limitations. The
number of states with such limitations has been drastically re-
duced, and undoubtedly within the next few years these limita-
tions will disappear. Furthermore, there has been a revolution
in choice of law principles which has permitted courts of other
states much greater flexibility in applying reasonable law to
these situations.56
Kriendler seems to take the position that if the problem is ignored
it will go away. It is true that at present only nine states have wrongful
death limitations,57 but among those nine are several states with centers
of high population concentrations and a high level of air traffic. The
risk of inequitable treatment of plaintiffs thus remains great because of
the limitations in those nine key states, and reliance upon state legisla-
tures to change the statutes limiting recovery may be in vain. State legis-
latures are not well known for their amenability to change or their re-
sponsiveness to the needs of the judicial system. In addition, insurance
companies, seeking to maintain maximum recovery limits wherever possi-
ble, lobby with some success in the various statehouses, while there is
seldom any organized effort to procure changes in these statutes, unless
initiated by the local bar associations.
E. Compensation for Iniym
In his statement Kriendler also criticized the Bill on the ground that
the compensation for wrongful death, though unlimited in amount, was
restricted to pecuniary loss only, and such a restriction would keep recov-
eries (and, necessarily, attorneys' fees) below a figure which may be reached
if a jury were to consider the mental suffering and loss of affections of the
decedent's survivors.58 However, this merely begs the question, especially
56. Hearings at 257.
57. See note 4, supra.
58. Hearings at 256.
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in light of his opinion that the Bill was unnecessary from a choice of law
standpoint, since most states have such provisions limiting recovery to
pecuniary loss.59 As Prosser points out,
pecuniary loss may extend beyond mere contributions of food,
shelter, and property or money; and now there is a decided tend-
ency to find that the society, care, and attention of the deceased
are "services" with a financial value which may be compensatedO
Thus, the fears expressed by Kriendler in this regard are probably ill-
founded.
IV. CONCLUSION
Senate Bill 961, like any legislative solution to a legal problem, will
not satisfy everyone. Nevertheless, it is a step in the right direction. The
need for legislation of this type is apparent in view of the inadequacy of
existing federal law.
Such an act would not significantly usurp any power of state courts since
most actions covered by the Bill would be filed in federal courts anyway.
Rather, the establishment of a uniform body of law to cover air crash
litigation can serve only to simplify the tasks of the courts and attorneys,
provided such law is properly drawn, eliminating in advance potential
areas of controversy. In addition, and probably most important, the Bill
would utilize the full potential of the Judicial Panel and could become a
model for future legislation of a similar character, especially in the anti-
trust field.
The Bill's deficiencies, while major, would not be difficult to change.
Such changes as proposed herein should not seriously impede the interests
of any groups currently favoring or opposing the legislation, but should
increase the probabilities of eventual passage by Congress. While the
author's manner of dealing with the problems raised by the Bill are not the
only solutions, they do seem as pointed out above to be more reasonable
than the present provisions.
KENNETh W. JOHNSON
59. W. PRossER, LAw oF TORTS § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
60. Id., citing the following cases: Gardner v. Hobbs, 69 Idaho 288, 206 P.2d
539 (1949); Van Cleve v. Lynch, 109 Utah 149, 166 P.2d 244 (1946); Herro v.
Steidl, 255 Wis. 65, 37 N.W.2d 874 (1949); Gulf Transport Co. v. Allen, 209 Miss.
206, 46 So. 2d 436 (1950); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 509 (Fla.
1952); Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931).
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APPENDIX
SENATE BILL NO. 961
91ST CONGRESS
To improve the judicial machinery by providing for Federal jurisdiction and
a body of uniform Federal law for cases arising out of aviation and space activities.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That chapter 85 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended-
(1) by adding a new sentence at the end of section 1333 as follows: "The ad-
miralty, maritime, and prize jurisdiction herein does not extend to any case arising
under chapter 174 of this title, and may extend in relation to the subject matter of
chapter 174 of this title only to the extent provided in section 1363 (b) of this chap-
ter.";
(2) by striking out the period at the end of section 1346 (b) and by inserting
in lieu thereof a comma and the following: "except that cases arising out of, or in
the course of, aviation activity or space activity as defined in chapter 174 of this
title, shall be governed thereby.";
(3) by adding a new section following section 1362 as follows:
"§ 1363. Aviation and space activities
"(a) The district courts, including those of the Canal Zone, Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands, shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts
of the States and of all other courts, of any action for damages for injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death arising out of, or in the course of, an
accident, which arises out of, or in the course of- (1) the flight, takeoff, or landing
of an aircraft- (A) engaged in the carriage by aircraft of persons or property as a
common carrier for compensation or hire, or (B) having a seating capacity of more
than ten persons; (2) the flight, takeoff, or landing of an aircraft and which
proximately results in the death of or personal injury to five or more persons; or
(3) space activity.
"(b) All the district courts mentioned in subsection (a) of this section and the
courts of the States, territories, possessions, and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall
have original jurisdiction, concurrently with any admiralty or maritime jurisdiction
which may otherwise exist, of any civil action not covered by subsection (a) of this
section which arises out of, or in the course of, ground activity which is incidental
to any of the aircraft operations or space activity described in subsection (a) of
this section.
"(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, all of the
district courts mentioned in subsection (a) of this section concurrently with the
courts of the States, territories, possessions, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action which- (1) arises out of or in the
course of an accident which arises out of or in the course of the flight, takeoff, or
landing of a- (A) large aircraft, (B) high-performance aircraft, or (C) public
aircraft; or (2) arises out of a transaction or occurrence which gives rise to an action
of which the district courts otherwise have jurisdiction under section 1346 (b) of this
chapter, and to which chapter 174 of this title is applicable.
"(d) Except as provided in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section, original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under chapter 174 of this title shall be vested
in-
"(1) the courts of the States, territories, possessions, and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and
"(2) the district courts, only to the extent such district court jurisdiction exists
under other provisions of law: Provided, That for the purpose of this clause and
such other provisions of law, chapter 174 shall be deemed not to be a law of the
United States.
"(e) DErnIONS.-" 'accident' means any occurrence which proximately re-
sults in the death of or injury to persons or injury to or loss of property and
includes any occurrence which, if it occurred with respect to a civil aircraft in
flight, would be an accident within the meaning of title VII of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1441 et seq.) [remainder omitted]
[V'ol. 35
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1970], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/6
COMMENTS
"(f) Jurisdiction of actions against the United States is not created under
this section, but exists to the extent provided in other provisions of law..
SEC. 2. Chapter 87 of title 28, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by striking out the period at the end of section 1402 (b) and inserting in
lieu thereof a comma and the following: "except as provided in section 1408 of
title.";
(2) by adding after section 1407 a new section as follows:
"§ 1408. Actions involving aviation and space activities, service of process
"(a) Any action under subsection (a) of section 1363 of this title may be
brought in the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or has his or its prin-
cipal place of business, or in which the defendant resides, is incorporated, is licensed
to do business, is doing business, or may be found. Any action against the United
States under section 1346 (b) of this title governed by chapter 174 of this title and
which arises out of or in the course of such aircraft operations or space activity as
are described in section 1363 (a) of this title may be brought in any judicial district.
"(b) Process in the actions referred to in subsection (a) of this section (in-
cluding third-party and other ancillary proceedings) may be served throughout thejurisdiction of the United States. Upon application and cause shown, in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a subpoena for attendance at a hearing
or trial in any action referred to in subsection (a) of this section or in any action
in a district court referred to in section 1363 (c) of this title may be served at any
place.
"(c) If actions referred to in subsection (a) of this section, arising out of the
same occurrence, are brought in more than one district, the judicial panel on multi-
district litigation authorized by section 1407 of this title may- (1) transfer such ac-
tion to any district for any or all purposes, as well as for pretrial proceedings, and
(2) at any time or stage in the proceedings, retransfer any, or any number of such
actions, or any separate claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or issue
or any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues
therein to the district from which originally transferred or to any other district.
Transfers and retransfers under this subsection shall be determined by the same
factors as transfers under section 1407 (a) of this title. The provisions respecting
the designation of, assignment of, and assignment of functions of the judicial panel
on multidistrict litigation, the provisions for procedure and review, and all other
provisions of the remainder of section 1407 of this title shall apply for all purposes,
as well as for pretrial proceedings to actions subject to this subsection, to transfers
and retransfers under this subsection, and to actions or parts of actions so trans-
ferred or retransferred.
"(d) This section does not affect any laws or rules of law or treaty provisions
governing the propriety or convenience of venue within the United States as a
whole .. "
SEc. 3. Chapter 161 of title 28, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by striking the period at the end of section 2401 (b) and inserting in lieu
thereof a comma and the following: "except as provided in subsections (c) and (d);
(2) by inserting at the end of section 2401 new clauses, as follows:
"(c) A tort claim against the United States governed by chapter 174 of this
title shall be forever barred unless action is begun not later than one year after
such claim accrues, except as provided in subsection (d) below.
"(d) A tort claim against the United States governed by chapter 174 of this title,
for contribution, indemnity or other remedy over, or that the United States is or
may be liable to the party asserting the claim for all or part of a claim originally
asserted against him in an action for damages under section 2752 of this title shall
be forever barred unless action to enforce such claim is begun not later than which-
ever is the latest of-" (1) one year after the original right of action accrued; "(2)
ninety days after service of process upon the party who is to assert such claim; or
" (3) the time permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if asserted
by counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint in the original action. .. ."
(3) by inserting in the text of section 2415 (b) after the word "Congress,"
the following: "and except as provided in subsection (c),"; and
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(4) by renumbering in section 2415 the respective subsections (c), (d), (e), (f),(g), and (h) as (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and inserting a new subsection as follows:
" (C) Subject to the provisions of section 2416 of this title, every action for
money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which
is founded upon a tort and which is governed by chapter 174 of this title shall be
barred unless the action is begun not later than one year after the right of action
first accrues: Provided, however, That in the case of a claim by the United States
for contribution, indemnity or other remedy over, or that another person or party
is or may be liable to the United States for all or part of a tort claim originally
asserted against the United States in an action for damages under section 2752 of
this title, time limitations for and conditions upon which the United States may
assert such claim shall be the same as in the case of a party asserting a like claim
against the United States as provided in section 2401 (d) of this title ..
Smc. 5. Part VI of title 28, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by adding a new chapter 174 following chapter 173 as follows:
"Chapter 174.-AVIATION AND SPACE ACTIVITIES
"§ 2741. Definitions [omitted]
"SUBCHAPTER 1--SUBSTANTIVE LAW
"§ 2751. Substantive law, generally
"(a) Subject to the exceptions, limitations, and exclusions of this subchapter,
there hereby exists a uniform body of Federal law governing all civil legal relations
and all acts, transactions, matters, and things (including injury or loss of property
or personal injury or death, regardless where consummated), arising out of, or in
the course of, aviation activity or space activity. The civil legal relations governed
thereby include all personal rights and liabilities (including those of all corpora-
tions, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, joint stock companies,
governments, and governmental entities as well as individuals) and all property
rights and liabilities. Said body of law is exclusive of any other law (including the
law of the several States, and of the territories and possessions, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the admiralty or maritime law) except
to the extent that the adoption therein of local law rules, including but not limited
to rules of domestic relations and inheritance law, would not thwart the purpose
of this section. The rules of said body of law shall be ascertained by decisions of
courts of competent jurisdiction in cases or controversies, subject to any other ap-
plicable Federal law or regulation having the force of law, or treaty, or other agree-
ment having the force of a treaty.
"(b) This section does not affect- (1) the power (of whatever extent, if any,
as otherwise may exist) of the several States, territories, possessions, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia of-(A) criminal jurisdiction and
application of the criminal laws; (B) civil and administrative penalties and for-
feitures imposable for the enforcement or vindication of public rights, powers, or
duties; (C) service of process; and (D) taxation; (2) the power of the several States
of economic regulation of commerce by air which is wholly intrastate, to the extent
that the same is not subject to, or is granted exemption from, economic regulation
by an agency of the United States. 'Economic regulation' as used in this clause
means regulation of matters and things which, if in interstate or foreign commerce,
would be within the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board (or a successor
agency) under title IV of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, or a successor statute.
"§ 2752. Accident actions; death actions; survival of personal injury ac-
tions
"(a) There is hereby specifically included in the body of law created in section
2751 of this subchapter the right of action for damages for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death arising out of, or in the course of, an accident, as defined
in section 1363 of this title, which arises out of, or in the course of, aviation activity,
or space activity subject to the exceptions, limitations, and exclusions of this chapter.
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Unless otherwise or hereafter provided by other Federal law or regulation having the
force of law or treaty or other agreements having the force of law or treaty- (1) the
contributory negligence doctrine of the law of the majority of the States of the
United States is applicable to any such action; (2) a right of contribution, arising
and enforcible at the same time as the above-mentioned right of action for damages,
exists among all parties who, if sued separately, are or would be liable on such right
of action for damages. Liability for and amount of contribution shall be apportioned
in accordance with the gravity of breach of duty found. Such right of contribution is
enforcible as soon as it arises, in the same or another action under otherwise proper
jurisdiction and procedure, against all such parties against whom it arises regardless
whether such parties were initially sued. The existence of this right of contribution
does not exclude the existence of the right of indemnity in otherwise proper cases."
"(b) For the exclusive benefit of the decedent's surviving or (1) the right of
action for death exists under subsection (a) of this section, and (2) the right of
action for personal injury to the decedent under subsection (a) of this section sur-
vives.
"(c) If the domicile at death of the decedent and the wrongful death or other
relevant law of such domicile can be ascertained without undue inconvenience and
if the adoption of the rules of such law would not thwart the purposes of this sec-
tion, the rules of such law shall determine the respective interests of the beneficiaries
in such right of action.
j " (d) The recovery under subsection (b) (1) of this section shall be a fair and
just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by those for whose benefit the
right of action exists. The recovery under subsection (b) (2) of this section shall not
include any damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement. There shall be no limita-
tion on the amount of recovery except as otherwise or hereafter provided by treaty
or other international agreement having the force of treaty or other Federal law or
regulation having the force of law.
"§ 2753. Time limitations
"(a) The right of action for damages under section 2752 of this subchapter
is forever barred unless the action is begun not later than one year after the right
of action accrues.
"(b) Every claim for contribution, indemnity or other remedy over, and every
other claim that a person or party is or may be liable to the party asserting the
claim for all or part of the claim originally asserted against him in an action for
damages under section 2752 of this subchapter, shall be forever barred unless action
to enforce such claim is begun not later than whichever is the latest of- (1) one year
after the original right of action accrues; (2) ninety days after service of process
upon the party who has been served such claims; or (3) such time as may be per-
mitted by the court for the reasonably diligent assertion of such claim, if asserted
by otherwise proper procedure in or ancillary to the original action.
"§ 2754. Exception of compensation remedies
"The provisions in this subchapter do not include any right of action for dam-
ages for personal injury or death where any such right of action would be incon-
sistent with the provisions or intent of any workmen's or employees' compensation
statute or system, or similar system of compensation or benefits, and do not affect
the operation of any workmen's or employees' compensation statute or system or
similar system of compensation or benefits.
"§ 2755. Outer space activity
"The uniform body of Federal law provided for in this subchapter extends to
space activity which is outside of the national sovereignty of the United States, but
the speific rules of substantive law therein to be applied to such space activity which
is outside of the national sovereignty of the United States shall be such as may be
otherwise or hereafter created or recognized by treaty or international agreement
having the force of treaty.
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"SUBCHAPTER III-DISTRICT COURT PROCEDURE
"§ 2761. Jury trial
"In actions in Federal district courts under this chapter, there is a right of trial
by jury of any issue of fact therein regardless where the action arises if in an other-
wise like case, but which arose at law, such right would exist under the United
States Constitution. In actions against the United States in Federal district courts
under this chapter the right, if any, of trial by jury may exist, if, when and to such
extent as may be otherwise or hereafter provided in other provisions of law.
"§ 2762. Death actions, survival of personal injury actions
"(a) If an action arising out of aviation or space activity provided for in section
2752 (b) of this chapter is brought in a Federal district court, otherwise having juris-
diction, the same may be brought in behalf of all of the beneficiaries by one or more
of them or by the personal representative of the decedent. All such claims of all
of the beneficiaries of the decedent shall be brought in one action.
"(b) For the purposes of this action, the district court may in its discretion
appoint a personal representative of the decedent if one has not been otherwise
properly appointed. Such personal representative shall have the responsibilities and
duties of a fiduciary in the State in which the personal representative is initially
qualified to act. A personal representative qualified to act hereunder in one district
is qualified to act in any other district to which or in which the action, or any, part
thereof, may be transferred or is pending.
"(c) Unless otherwise determined in accordance with rules of law adopted as
provided in section 2752 (c) of this title, shall apportion the recovery, if any, among
those entitled to the benefit thereof in proportion to the loss they severally suffered
by reason of the death of the decedent and the damages shall not form a part of the
estate of the deceased.
"(d) Where a right of action mentioned in subsection (a) of this section exists
for the death of a person, and there is already an action pending in a district court
in behalf of the decedent for personal injury claimed to result from the same occur-
rence, a separate action for such death shall not be brought, but the court shall per-
mit whoever may bring an original action for the death of the decedent to be subl
stituted as a party in the pending action, upon application properly and timely
made in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the action shall
thereafter proceed as if originally brought as an action for the death of the de-
cedent.
"§ 2763. Separate trials and judgments
"In any action referred to in section 1408 (a) of this title-
"(a) Separate trial may be had of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-
party claim, or of any separate issue, or of any number of claims, counterclaims,
cross-claims, third-party claims, or issues, if such separate trial is otherwise proper.
"(b) Upon the separate trial of any issue or issues within a claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or when there are multiple parties thereto, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
of the issues or parties upon an express determination that it is in the interest of
efficient administration of justice to do so and upon an express direction for such
entry of judgment . . ."
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